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Abstract
This thesis investigates how the relationship  between the said and the meant 
in Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass exposes the 
paradoxical condition of language. First, the theoretical framework accounts 
for the theory  of language put forth by Jacques Derrida. Here it  is concluded 
that discrepancies between the said and the meant are properties of 
language. This is due to the paradoxical necessary impossibility of assuming 
a language structure, context and meaning, and the dissemination of 
meaning that accompanies every word. Second, in a close-reading of the 
Alice books, Derrida’s theory of language is set in relation to the texts. This 
is done by  examining how Alice and the inhabitants of Wonderland and the 
Looking-Glass World treat the relationship between what they  say and what 
they  mean. The analysis has thus consisted of three aspects: the use of puns, 
established expressions, and the notion of mastery of language. Based on the 
presented material, this study  concludes that the paradoxical condition of 
language is exposed through Alice’s need to assume meaning and context of 
the words uttered in Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World, however she 
finds that this can never be ensured. Further, the characters refusal to 
assume a meaning exposes the necessary impossibility of assumptions. 
Literal meaning, or one meaning bound to the intention and presence of the 
speaker is in their view what governs understanding. No assumptions are 
necessary, as everyone should say what they mean and mean what they say. 
Still, this unwillingness does not make their intentions the master of 
meaning, which is exposed by Alice’s simultaneously naïve, questioning and 
displeased attitude towards the confusions she experiences.
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1 Introduction
Lewis Carroll and the Alice books hold a unique place in the history of literature. Being a 
mathematical logician, his texts written for children have since their publication had a large number, 
if not a majority, of adult readers. In a context  of nonsense, the texts play  with and expose 
discrepancies in a multitude of philosophical and scientific discursive categories, logic and 
understandings. The condition of language can be seen as one of the targets. The relationship 
between what the characters of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World say and what they mean 
creates confusion for Alice. Arguably, all the madness and contradictions of meaning that Alice 
experiences, illustrate properties of the language system and are made possible by the paradox 
language must work within.
1.1 Purpose of study
The intent of this thesis is to study the exposing effects of Alice in Wonderland (1865) and Through 
the Looking-Glass (1871). I argue that through the characters of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass 
World’s understanding of the relationship between what they say  and what they mean, this 
relationship  can be questioned. I argue that the most  generative exposing force of these texts is the 
play  with language and meaning, where shortcomings, discrepancies and downright absurdities are 
in the spot light.
This thesis uses the theory of language put  forth by Jacques Derrida as its framework, where the 
condition of language can be viewed as paradoxical. The intent of this thesis is thus to investigate 
how this condition of language is exposed in the Alice books, and thereby establish a connection 
between Derrida’s understanding of language and the texts in question. By examining how the 
characters in the texts regard their own utterances, I argue that a necessary impossibility of a 
language structure, meaning and context is exposed. 
 In clear text, this thesis addresses the following question:
How does the relationship between the said and the meant in Wonderland 
and the Looking-Glass World expose the paradoxical condition of 
language?
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1.2  Material
The primary material in this thesis is Lewis Carroll’s Alice books. However, in order to answer the 
thesis question, an extensive investigation of texts regarding Derrida’s complex understanding of 
meaning is needed. Derrida’s own texts concerning language, along with thorough reviews of these 
texts will constitute the key material of the theoretical framework.
The aspects of the Alice books that are of relevance to this thesis are the passages that concern 
language and meaning, and expose the condition of language. Thus, the relevant literary material is 
narrowed down to puns, expressions, and the notion of mastery of language.
1.3 Previous research
It is safe to say  that the Alice books have been a frequent object of research. Within the field of 
children’s literature, many researchers have argued that the evolvement of children’s status, 
situation and cultural options during the nineteenth century  can be illustrated with Carroll’s texts.1 
Sarah Gilead points out that Alice’s dream can be understood as “[...] a child’s uncomprehending 
but lucid view of mad adult reality.”2  The phenomenological difficulties, the harshness of adults, 
and the moralization children face is taken to the extreme, but also the idealization of childhood as a 
purely joyous and carefree time in a person’s life is questioned.3
The Alice books have been used to illustrate aspects within a wide range of disciplines, for 
example neurology, psychology and law.4  Furthermore, Derrida has used the texts as a point of 
entry  into a discussion concerning the interaction and hierarchy between humans and animals.5 The 
Alice books have also been used in order to illustrate problems and arguments in language 
philosophical inquiries. With his The Logic of Sense (1969) and the essay Lewis Carroll (1993), 
Gilles Deleuze discusses the Alice books in relation to language, identity, becoming, the surface of 
things, sense and nonsense. As Claire Colebrook states, Deleuze uses the Alice books in order to 
illustrate his view of language as an active creation and transformation of sense, rather than a 
reactive representation.6  Sense can, in Deleuze’s use of the term, not be reduced to meaning in 
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1 cf. Karen L. McGavock, “Agents of reform?: Children’s literature and philosophy”, Philosophia, vol. 35, no. 2, 2007
2 Sarah Gilead, “Magic Abjured: Closure in Children's Fantasy Fiction”, PMLA, vol. 106, no. 2, March 1991, p. 282
3 Ibid.
4  cf. Randolph W. Evans & Loren A. Rolak, “The Alice in Wonderland Syndrome”, Headache, vol. 44 no.  6, 2004; 
Richard A. Epstein jr.’s “Alice’s Loss of Wonderland”,  Residential Treatment for Children and Youth, vol. 20, no. 4, 
2003; Parker B. Potter, “Punishment in Wonderland”, International Journal of Punishment and Sentencing, vol. 4, no. 
2, 2008
5 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, Fordham University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 7-9
6 Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 111-112
language, as sense is what allows language to be meaningful.7 Lewis Carroll combines language in 
new ways, for example with his ‘portmanteau’ words, in order to produce a new sense.8 
This thesis aims to fill what I argue is a gap in the literature regarding the Alice books, and 
generate a new approach to the treatment of language in the texts in order to add to the established 
readings. Even though the angle may not have been grossly overlooked in previous research, no 
connection has been made explicitly between Derrida’s understanding of the relationship between 
the said and the meant, and the Alice books. Thus, this study aims to create a comprehensive 
connection between Derrida’s theory of language and meaning, and the texts in question. 
1.4 Delimitations
In addition to play with the relationship between the said and meant, the Alice texts also uses 
allegories that can be interpreted as references to the condition of language. For example, games 
with indistinguishable rules, or rules which no one seems to follow, can be seen as directed at 
language. However, as this study  focuses on passage that concern meaning and language directly, 
and the understandings of meaning that are conveyed, this aspect must be subsequently ruled out.
This study does not make use of Deleuze’s discussion concerning the Alice books. I have no 
doubt that his extensive reading of the texts could have a valuable impact on the analysis. However, 
this thesis focuses on the language theory put forth by  Derrida. Professor of philosophy Gordon 
Bearn has argued that the difference between Deleuze and Derrida is the difference between Yes 
and No; the difference between the Deleuzian game you can never lose and the Derridean game you 
can never win.9 If Deleuze’s understanding of paradoxes and language where to be incorporated in 
this study, a thorough comparative analysis regarding Derrida’s and Deleuze’s theory would be 
integral. Unfortunately, the scope of this study prohibits such a comparison.
The reading of the Alice books focuses purely on the text, without taking historical context into 
consideration. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the fact that Carroll was a logician is kept 
in mind. The context that is of utmost importance in this thesis is language itself, leaving anything 
that might go beyond or outside the language of the texts irrelevant. This does not exclude a 
theoretical approach to language, where other texts have an impact on the reading of the Alice 
books.
5
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Gordon C.F. Bearn, “Differentiating Derrida and Deleuze”, Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 33. no. 4, Oct. 2000, 
p. 441 
1.5 Disposition
In chapter 2 the method and interpretational criterion of this thesis is outlined. In chapter 3 the 
theoretical framework, consisting of Derrida’s theory of language and meaning, is discussed. 
Chapter 4 constitutes the analysis of Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, which is 
based on the outlined method and theoretical framework. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the 
thesis.
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2 Method
The following chapter presents the method used in this thesis. This consists of a close-reading of the 
Alice books, where I will investigate how the texts expose the condition of language. In order to 
guide the process of analysis, I will propose a criterion for interpretation.
2.1 Close-reading
The methodological technique of this thesis is ultimately a close and attentive reading of Alice in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. The approach has first  consisted of reading the two 
texts in their entirety, and then a selection of the passages that would have the most  fruitful bearing 
on the thesis question has been made. The analysis will be made up of text passages that reveal the 
troublesome relationship  between the said and the meant, and how this exposes the condition of 
language.
Close-reading as a technique of study  evokes a question: how can the analysis be valid beyond 
my subjective interpretation and prerequisite knowledge? The answer to this is that  a demand of 
objective epistemological operationalization cannot be firmly met or secured through close-reading. 
However, an attempt to meet such a demand, without claiming it as absolute, should be made.
Derrida’s understanding of language, which is presented in the following chapter, will serve as 
the philosophical ground and interpretational criterion towards which the analysis will be put into 
context. The use of this theory  does not stem directly from the general strategy of deconstruction, 
but uses the conclusions of Derrida’s works as a criterion for interpretation in the reading of the 
Alice books. Thus, this thesis will use the paradoxical condition of language that can be derived 
from Derrida’s understanding as a point of reference which the conclusions will be tried against.
 I am not proposing a complete coherency between theory and texts as a criterion, naming all the 
implications that do not fit into Derrida’s theory of language as marginal and of no importance in 
the understanding of the texts. Nor am I proposing that this thesis can account for the entirety  of the 
Alice books. Derrida’s understanding of language can be criticized, however it proves to be valuable 
as a contextualization of the material in question.
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3 Theoretical framework
In the following chapter the theoretical framework relevant for this thesis is presented. First, I will 
account for the general strategy of deconstruction. Second, the effects deconstruction has had on 
two models of signification, the writing/speech opposition and Austin’s serious/non-serious speech 
acts, will be discussed. It is important to give an overview of the general strategy and the 
deconstruction of these models of signification, as they are necessary in order to understand the 
third point of the theoretical framework: Derrida’s theory of language, structure, context, intention 
and meaning. Finally, the concept of irony will illustrate the understanding Derrida proposes 
regarding the relationship between the said and the meant and the paradoxical condition of 
language. 
3.1 Deconstruction
Deconstruction is, when understood most fundamentally, a mode of philosophical and literary 
analysis derived from the interrogations of basic philosophical categories and ideas by Jacques 
Derrida. In his work, Derrida takes on a number of concepts in order to show how they are 
undermining their own stability, justification and logic.10
3.1.1 The general strategy of deconstruction
If deconstruction has a general strategy, it is described by Derrida as addressing the violent 
hierarchy of facing terms in traditional philosophical oppositions.11  The oppositions that can be 
found in philosophy do not coexist peacefully: one term dominates the other, axiologically, 
logically etc, and occupies the commanding position.12  An essential step when deconstructing a 
concept produced in texts, is therefore to reverse this hierarchy in order to reveal its instability.13 
However, it  is important  to note that  this approach is double: rather than claiming a superior 
authority or appealing to a higher logical principle, the practitioner of deconstruction works within 
the terms of the system but with the intention to disrupt and destabilize it.14  In other words, the 
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10 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 132
11 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism, 25th anniversary ed., Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2007,  p. 85
12 Ibid,
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. pp. 86-87
practitioners of deconstruction do not move outside the system, discourse or text they  deconstruct, 
but makes use of the very principle, opposition or concept in order to displace it.15 
Therefore, the deconstruction of an opposition should not demolish and thereby render a monism 
of the underprivileged term.16 While showing how an opposition is undone by a text, the opposition 
is still a part of the argument, putting the practitioner in a position of unwarrantable involvement, 
rather than skeptical detachment.17 The intent of deconstruction is not to generate a new kind of 
theory  that will set everything straight.18  To be clear, the oppositions employed by a text, do not 
demonstrate and should not be regarded as mistakes or accidents that occasionally occur: it  is a 
structural property and a rhetorical strategy  of the discourse itself.19  Therefore, an objective of 
correcting flaws would ultimately  claim a secure point of externality, and would in turn reproduce 
the very principle that  deconstruction sets out to take into critical focus. On the contrary, 
deconstruction holds up provisional and intractable starting points by appealing to attested 
meanings and fundamental assumptions of the discourse in order to reveal and deconstruct them.20 
3.1.2 The speech/writing opposition
In Of Grammatology (1967), Derrida discusses the devaluation of writing in philosophy, and the 
understanding that writing is an impure, non-transparent and artificial supplement to speech.21 
Speech has been regarded as a direct mediation of thought where the signifiers do not obtrude as 
material characters, and any ambiguities can be explained by  the speaker. Writing, on the other 
hand, reveals all the unfortunate aspects of mediation: the materiality  of the linguistic sign, the 
possible artful rhetorical figures of communication, or the absence of a subject who can clarify their 
intended meaning.22  This notion of phonocentrism, where speech has a direct and natural 
relationship  with meaning, and writing is seen as a representation of speech, is inextricably 
associated with the epistemological faith in logocentrism.23  Derrida is critical of the logocentric 
tradition in philosophy, which has left philosophy to define itself against  writing, as the goal has 
been the order of meaning — thought, reason, logic, truth, the Word — that transcends language 
and exists as a central foundation.24
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15 Ibid. p. 150
16 Jacques Derrida, Positions, Univ. of Chicago P., Chicago, 1982, p. 41
17 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, pp. 87-88
18 Ibid. p. 109
19 Ibid. p. 89
20 Ibid. p. 225
21 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Corrected ed, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998, p. 7
22 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, pp. 90-91
23 Ibid. p. 92
24 Ibid. pp. 90-91
In his extensive reading of Saussure, Derrida argues that even though Saussure postulates a 
critique of logocentrism by claiming that signs are arbitrary, and insisting on the purely relational 
nature of the linguistic system, he cannot escape the logocentric conception in his treatment of 
writing.25 Here, the logocentric idea of though, reason and truth versus the way to access the logos 
is evident: writing is divorced from the thought that produced the intelligible meaning.26 From this 
notion, Saussure argues that the spoken word alone constitutes the object of linguistic inquiry.27 
However, whilst claiming that writing exists solely as representational supplementation of speech, 
Saussure also argues that writing is the best tool for making the differential and relational nature of 
signs clear and evident, as they are visible marks.28  Here lies the self-deconstructive effect of 
Saussure’s text. If writing is the most adequate way of clarifying the nature of the spoken word, 
then this destabilizes the hierarchical understanding of writing as a supplement to speech. 
Such an understanding implies that writing is an inessential extra, but supplementation is only 
necessary  if speech itself is inadequate in conveying meaning.29 Through his reading of Rousseau’s 
Confessions (1782-1789), where Rousseau discusses writing as a supplement to speech, education 
as a supplement to nature, masturbation as a supplement  to “normal” sexual activity, Derrida argues 
that the logic of the supplement would entail the supplement to resemble the supplemented in some 
essential way.30 This would mean that the qualities generally attributed to writing, the possibility of 
misunderstanding, the absence of a clarifying subject, are also qualities that mark speech. This leads 
Derrida to propose an emerging necessity: the infinite chain of supplements produce the sense of 
the very  thing they supplement. 31  Thus, the opposition which assumes writing to be marked as 
insufficient, and threatening to the purity of speech, is destabilized.
3.1.3 Austin’s problem with non-serious utterances
Through his theory of speech acts, J.L. Austin puts forth the study of the use of language [parole], 
contrary to Saussure’s objective of studying the linguistic system in it’s own right [langue]. 
Meaning is determined by many factors other than word’s lexical or grammatical definition, and 
Austin argues that language should be seen as performative, not merely  descriptive or constative.32 
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25 Derrida, Of Grammatology, op. cit, pp. 30ff
26 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, pp. 99-100
27 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, Owen, London, 1960, pp. 23-24
28 Derrida, Of Grammatology, op. cit, pp. 52-57
29 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, pp. 102-103
30 Derrida, Of Grammatology, op. cit, pp. 144-152
31 Ibid. p. 157
32 Georg Henrik von Wright, Logik, filosofi och språk: strömningar och gestalter i modern filosofi, [Ny utg.], Nya 
Doxa, Nora, 1993, pp. 218-219
For Austin, this does not lead the foundation of meaning back to the speaker’s performative 
intention, but the conventional rules involving features of the context the utterance occurs in.33 For 
example, the utterance “I promise X” is not descriptive, but an action done with words. Whether or 
not the speaker keeps their promise, or ever intended to keep  it, is irrelevant: Austin does not treat 
failure as some external accident that threatens the nature of the performative, but sees the 
possibility of failure as essential to it.34
Austin attempts a critique of logocentric premisses by refusing to explain meaning as the 
intention of the speaker, and by attacking philosophers who have regarded utterances that cannot be 
named true or false as marginal.35  Nevertheless, Derrida argues that Austin reintroduces this 
premiss when he urges a distinction between serious and non-serious utterances.36  “Surely  the 
words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken ‘seriously’? This is, though vague, true 
enough in general—it is an important commonplace in discussing the purport of any utterance 
whatsoever. I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem.”37 Austin sees the non-serious 
use of language as “parasitic upon its normal use”, and thereby excludes this from consideration: 
“[o]ur performative utterances [...] are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances.”38 
Thus, as Saussure excludes writing as a distortion, Austin names non-serious utterances as 
marginal, impure and of no consequence for his theory. Austin’s text deconstructs itself by 
reintroducing the notion of intention and logos.39 
3.2 Language without security
I have now outlined two language theories which have proved to undermine their own justification. 
From this I will move on to Derrida’s own understanding of language.
3.2.1 The non-center in language
Derrida’s theory  destabilizes the traditional understanding which he identified as reliant on a center 
in language.40 The center functions as a balancer and an organizer of the structure, and as a limiter 
11
33 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, p. 111
34 Jacques Derrida, “Struktur händelse kontext”, Marc-Wogau, K. Carlshamre, S. & Bergström, L. (red.) Filosofin 
genom tiderna. 1900-talet. Efter 1950, 2., [rev. och utök.] uppl., Thales, Stockholm, 2008, pp. 128-131
35 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, p. 115
36 Ibid. pp. 115-116
37 John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words: the William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University 
in 1955, 2. ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1975, p. 9
38 Ibid. pp. 21-22
39 Ibid.
40  Jacques Derrida, “Struktur, tecken och spel i humanvetenskapernas diskurs”, Entzenberg, C. & Hansson, C. (red.), 
Modern litteraturteori: från rysk formalism till dekonstruktion, 2. uppl., Studentlitteratur, Lund, 1993’, pp. 389-390 
and an enabler of the structure’s play.41 However, the center is contradictory coherent: the center 
controls, and thereby  eludes the structure — the center is simultaneously outside and inside the 
structure it  controls.42 Within this thought, by the power of being a center, it  should be defined only 
by itself. The breaking point, Derrida suggests, was perhaps initiated when the necessary  attempt to 
articulate and repeat the center by  supplementing it began.43 As mentioned in regards to the speech/
writing opposition, this would imply  that the supplement in some essential way resembles and can 
correct an original lack in the supplemented. The supplement can never be a substitute for 
something that has in some way existed before the supplementation, thus the supplement must 
produce the center.44  Derrida sees a need to imagine a non-center: in the absence of a center 
everything becomes discourse, and we can no longer think in terms of a system where the center, 
the original transcendental signified, is absolutely present outside a system of differences.45
Derrida argues that the notion and authority  of presence in the history  of western philosophy has 
benefited the logocentric epistemology and has structured all our thinking: the presence of an 
essence; the presence of meaning; temporal presence of the now or the moment; self-presence, 
subjectivity; intersubjectivity, etc.46  This is profound in trivial understandings of language. For 
example, in considering the meaning of an utterance as the idea or intention of the speaker at  the 
moment of speaking, evokes the reliance on presence: temporal, subjective and intersubjective 
presence.47 Derrida argues that the authority  of presence is a complex construction, and claims that 
language is never marked simply by presence or absence.48 
3.2.2 Structure, event and différance
In language, there is a paradox of structure and event: the structure of a language is a product of 
previous speech acts (events), but when investigating the events that presumably  determine the 
structure, one finds that every event is determined and made possible by prior structures.49  The 
structure of language and the particular language events cannot be separated, and becomes almost 
like the discussion of which came first: the chicken or the egg. An attempt to determine a first 
structure or event of language might be impossible, since we must always assume some prior 
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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. p. 391
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. 
46 Derrida, Of Grammatology, op. cit, p. 12
47 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, p. 94
48 Derrida, Positions, op. cit, p. 26
49 Culler, On Deconstruction, op.cit, p. 95
structures of signification, which then again where made up of previous events. Language must 
have a pre-existing order, as it is not something we make up as we go along, but each conversation 
also alters and defers that order: “[e]ach inscription of a lawful language is particular, and each 
instance of a concept fails to fulfill the concept in general.”50 Thus, language events are structured 
by a system, but the system is never fully capable of determining the meaning of the events.
In this paradox of structure and event, how can the meaning of words be determined? The 
meaning of a word is marked by the presence of previous meanings given to this word in speech 
act, but is simultaneously marked by the traces and difference from other words.51  Derrida 
introduces the term différance, from the French word differer meaning both differ and defer. Also, it 
is a conscious misspelling of the word différence.52 This seems to be a taunting remark directed at 
the inadequacy of Saussure’s notion of there in language being only difference without positive 
terms.53 Furthermore, it may be seen as directed at the speech/writing opposition: the difference 
between the two words are not apparent in speech, only in writing.54 Différance refers to the (1) 
passive difference of words, which already  exists as a condition of signification, (2) the active 
deferring of a sign’s meaning, and (3) the active differing from other signs that must be appealed to 
in order for it  to signify.55 Différance “[...] is a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived 
on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. Différance is the systematic play of differences, of 
traces of differences, of the spacing by which elements relate to one another.”56  This should be 
exemplified: if I say ‘box’, it is passively separated from ‘ox’, ‘pox‘, ‘fox’.  But the meaning of the 
word is deferred as it stands on its own. By adding “cardboard box”, “Xbox” or “box of 
chocolates”, the meaning of the word becomes more focused. ‘Box’ differs from ‘canister’, ‘carton’ 
and ‘trunk’, which even though they in some way are all boxes, signify something different.
3.2.3 Context, intention and dissemination
Derrida argues that for language to function, we must  accept that meaning cannot merely rely on the 
context, but assume some proper meaning that exceeds a context.57  The possibility of being 
repeated and altered outside a single context is a condition for a sign to have meaning: “[a] mark 
13
50 Colebrook, Irony, Routledge, New York, 2004, pp. 97-98
51 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, pp. 95-96
52 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Univ. of Chicago P., Chicago, 1982, pp. 2-4
53 Saussure, op.cit, p. 120
54 Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction, Augmented ed., Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2002, p. 41
55 Culler, On Deconstruction, op. cit, p. 97
56 Derrida, Positions, op. cit, p. 27
57 Colebrook, Irony, op.cit, p. 97
that could not in any way detach itself from its singular context – however slightly  and, if only 
through repetition, reducing, dividing and multiplying it by identifying it – would no longer be a 
mark.”58  In order for something to be a sign, it must  have the ability to be repeated, cited and 
altered in all sorts of circumstances, thus including the non-serious circumstances that Austin 
eliminates.59 This does not imply that  context should be eliminated: meaning is bound to context, 
but the context is boundless and can neither be entirely determined nor can it totally govern and 
ensure meaning.60
Meaning must also necessarily exceed the private intent of the speaker. If language is to be used 
successfully, by being meaningful and understood by others, it must have a force beyond private 
intent.61  Before meaning, intent or speech acts, there must lie a system of sounds and marks that 
make meaning, intent and uttering possible.62  Any use of language is necessarily bound to the 
structure it inhabits, not only  to the meanings produced by the structure, but also to the unintended 
and ‘accidental’ effects.63
With the term dissemination the problem of naming intention as a foundation of meaning 
becomes clearer. According to Gordon Bearn, Derrida suggests that the semantic power of words lie 
in them not being reducible to neither a ridged meaning nor regulated polysemic meanings.64 Many 
of Derrida’s own terms play with this impossibility of reduction, and the example différance has 
already been discussed. Dissemination is also filled with several meanings, as ‘sem’ plays on 
semen, referring to sperm, and sèmes which refers to the basic semantic feature, the sign.65 The term 
would thus call attention to the fertile dispersal of infinite possibilities of meaning that accompany 
every  sign, and thus goes beyond the control of a stable interpretation.66  Stability in meaning is 
impossible, as words are constantly filled with endless, always increasing possibilities of meaning.67 
The term dissemination should not be confused or be seen as equal to ‘ambiguity’, as ambiguity 
implies a limited number of possible meanings.68 What Derrida is insisting on with this term, is the 
impossibility  of totalization, which ranges from the basic unit of language to context and to the 
entire system of language. Within the structure, language consists of play and différance, and can 
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never be totalized or fully present.69 The lack of totalization does, however, not imply that one can 
speak or write from a position of pure play: language must be structured by  some sort of system.70 
Rather, this should be understood as the possibility of any utterance having the potential of meaning 
something other than what is thought of as a stable and established meaning.71  This leaves the 
notion of linguistic mastery, of the structure and of one’s own utterances, as a mere product of 
wishful thinking.72
 3.3 Destabilizing the said and the meant
I have now accounted for the main aspects of Derrida’s understanding of language. In order to make 
the theoretical approach to the relationship between the said and the meant as effective as possible, I 
will now illustrate Derrida’s understanding by  exemplifying with a classical concept that plays 
precisely on this relationship, namely irony. However, this does not imply  a focus on the verbal 
irony of the Alice texts: what I am investigating is how the texts expose a discrepancy in language, 
and how the relationship  between the said and the meant in general is destabilized. Still, I argue that 
the way irony can be viewed in light of Derrida’s theory may be one of the most fruitful manners of 
accounting for this relationship. Following this exemplification, I will summarize what can be 
understood as the paradoxical condition of language. 
The language figure of irony initiates a problem with regards to meaning as it can, in logical 
terms and in its most simple use, be reduced to A = not A: what is being said is not what is meant. 
The intention of the sender would therefore seem an appropriate origin of the meaning of such an 
utterance. Furthermore, Douglas Muecke and Wayne Booth have argued that  irony relies on a 
shared context and views.73 If irony  is a figure of language that necessarily leads meaning back to 
intention and a stable context, irony would seemingly pose a problem for Derrida’s understanding 
of language. 
3.3.1 Irony as a property of language
Derrida never explicitly  dealt with the concept of irony in his works.74 However, his understanding 
of language can be successfully  applied to irony, and visa versa: irony can effectively  illustrate 
Derrida’s theory. 
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In the context of this theory, it is important not to think of irony as some unexplainable or 
marginal feature of language. Naming irony as something that stands outside the theory of language 
outlined above, or as a parasitic destabilizer of ‘ordinary  language’, would reproduce the arguments 
Derrida opposes in his deconstruction of Austin’s non-serious utterances. If irony, or non-serious 
utterances, are possible, it  is because they are a property of language. Such utterances are in no way 
a special distortion, an impure or an exceptional form of non-transparent language, but stem from 
the potential of all utterances meaning something other that what may be regarded as the stable 
meaning.75 Nothing outside language can secure that meaning is successfully conveyed, and there is 
always the possibility of a different meaning than what might have been intended.
The speech/writing opposition named speech as a direct  conveyer of meaning, where nuances of 
meaning or misunderstandings could be clarified by the present speaker, for example by the tone of 
voice. Irony might be thought of as easier to grasp if the sender of the ironic message is present. 
However, as previously mentioned, the insufficient qualities historically given to writing are just as 
prominent in speech. Irony does not have a more secure foundation in speech than in writing, as the 
possibility of misinterpretation is a property of the language system.
Therefore, all language and all forms of lingual mediation face the “problem” that irony faces: 
the boundless context, the non-totalized structure, the dissemination of signs which can disrupt 
intentions etc. All utterances have the potential of meaning something other than what is said: all 
language is potentially ironic.76  What this illustrates is that discrepancies been the said and the 
meant cannot  be a special case of lingual circumstances. In this theory, irony cannot always have a 
metaphysical feature due to the assumption of intention or a joint  context, contrary to Paul 
Tenngart‘s claims.77  Such assumptions are always necessary, but  they are nevertheless equally 
impossible. 
3.3.2 The paradoxical condition of language
The paradoxical condition of language that has now been discussed can be summarizes in Derrida’s 
idea of necessary impossibility.78  This can be schematically outlined as the following:
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(1) A lawful, pre-existing structure of language, and a proper meaning of the sign must be 
assumed in order for an utterance to mean something.79
(2) A lawful, totalized structure of language can never be achieved and is strictly  impossible.80 
Proper meaning is necessarily absent and deferred.81
(3) All utterances potentially mean something other than what is said, and meaning cannot be 
firmly governed.
The paradox lies in the necessary presumption of structure and meaning, while still accepting that a 
total structure and meaning is impossible. In order for language to function, we must assume a 
structure, a context and a meaning, but accept that these factors can never be pinned down and 
firmly ensure meaning. ‘Accidental’ meaning and disruption of the structure is a property  of 
language, and these aspects can never be mastered. The paradoxical condition of language is what 
makes discrepancies between the said and the meant possible.
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4 I say what I mean, I mean what I say
I have now argued that discrepancies between the said and the meant are made possible by the 
paradoxical condition of language. With this claim at hand, the focus can now be turned to how this 
is exposed in Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. The analysis is centered around 
three aspects of the texts that have impact on language and meaning: puns, established expressions 
and the notion of mastery of language.
In order to limit the number of footnotes, the first reference made to either Alice in Wonderland 
or Through the Looking-Glass is given as usual, while the following references are given with the 
page number in question in parenthesis. Both texts are found in the Norton Critical Edition of Alice 
in Wonderland. 
4.1 “I know they’re talking nonsense”
Alice thought the whole thing very absurd, but they all looked so grave that she did 
not dare to laugh [...]. 
    Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
As mentioned in the introduction, I regard the Alice books as texts that continuously  play on 
meaning. The characters of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World claim to mean exactly what 
they  say, “‘neither more nor less.’”82  Seemingly, they wish to leave no room for another meaning. 
Alice, on the other hand, is frequently confused and names the proposed meaning impossible: by 
her logic and understanding, what they say cannot be what they mean, as this would be nonsense.
The premisses of the books must be taken into account: Alice is transported from the ‘real’ world 
to Wonderland through a rabbit  hole, and to the Looking-Glass World through the mirror in her 
living room (however, as is revealed in the closing chapters of each book, it might have all been just 
a dream). The curiouser and curiouser experiences in these places leave her thinking that a very few 
things are really ever impossible. Thus, the absurdities she encounters are possible, as the 
contextual conceivabilities of the ‘real’ world do not intervene in Wonderland or the Looking-Glass 
World.
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4.2 “Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves”
In the Alice books, puns play an integral role, and pose an interesting problem for the idea of stable 
meaning. Two kinds of puns are investigated in the following passages: (a) puns that play on the 
same or similar audial sign, but are visibly  different in writing, and (b) puns that have the same 
audial and physical sign.
4.2.1 “I mean what I say”
After their swim in the pool of tears, the Mouse wishes to tell Alice his “‘[...] long and sad tale’”. 
(p. 24) Alice, misinterpreting the use of the audial sign, comments “‘[i]t is a long tail, 
certainly,” [...] looking down with wonder at  the Mouse’s tail; ‘but why  do you call it  sad?’” (Ibid.) 
The intertwined play with tale/tail is further underlined when the Mouse’s tale takes its written, 
physical structure in the shape of a tail. (p. 25) Seemingly, the material form of the tale is evident to 
Alice, as when there is an interruption in the Mouse’s story  Alice remarks “‘I beg your pardon, [...] 
you had gotten to the fifth bend, I think?’ ‘I had not!’ cried the Mouse, sharply  and very angrily. ‘A 
knot!’ said Alice [...]. ‘Oh, do let me help  to undo it!’ ‘I shall do nothing of the sort’, said the Mouse 
[...]. ‘You insult me by talking such nonsense!’” (Ibid.) 
In Alice’s meeting with the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon, the use of puns is intense. The Mock 
Turtle begins to tell the story of how he once was a real turtle and went to school in the sea: 
“The master was an old Turtle—we used to call him Tortoise.”
“Why did you call him Tortoise, if he wasn’t one?” Alice asked. 
“We called him Tortoise because he taught  us,” said the Mock Turtle angrily. 
“Really you are very dull!”
“You ought  to be ashamed of yourself for asking such a simple question,” added 
the Gryphon [...].” (pp. 74-75) 
The pun used here is founded on the similar sounding sign ‘Tortoise’ and ‘taught us’ in British 
English, leading the master to be called ‘Tortoise’, even though he was an old turtle.
In the song that  accompanies the Lobster-Quadrille, another pun based on similar sounding 
words creates confusion. 
“Will you walk a little faster?” said a whiting to a snail,
“There’s a porpoise close behind us, and he’s treading on my tail.”
[---]
“If I’d been the whiting,” said Alice, [...] “I’d have said to the porpoise ‘Keep back, 
please! We don’t want you with us!”
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“They were obliged to have him with them,” the Mock Turtle said. “No wise fish 
would go anywhere without a porpoise.”
“Wouldn’t it really?” said Alice, in a tone of great surprise.
“Of course not,” said the Mock Turtle. “Why, if a fish came to me, and told me he was 
going a journey, I should say, ‘With what porpoise?’”
“Don’t you mean ‘purpose’?” said Alice.
“I mean what I say,” the Mock Turtle replied, in an offended tone. (pp. 79-81)
The misunderstandings and confusions that occur in these passages are all due to the ‘accidental’ 
identical or similar sounding audial sign some words share: tale—tail; knot—not; Tortoise—taught 
us; porpoise—purpose. In speech some kind of differentiation of context would be required in order 
to separate them. However, in Wonderland, Alice finds that such a context cannot be taken for 
granted. With her understanding of sense and possibilities, Alice has trouble accepting that the 
characters of Wonderland mean just what they say.
The examples of audial signs referring to several meanings highlight how speech, or rather 
representation of speech through writing, is placed in the textual foreground of the Alice books. The 
lack of transparency is in these cases products of ‘accidents’ in spoken language. However, in 
writing the material différance between these signs are evident. The reader of the text has no 
problem separating these words, underlining the condition of spoken language. Still, the texts play 
to an equal extent on the signs that are both audibly  and materially  identical, thus complicating the 
matter.
 At the Mad Tea-Party, the Dormouse is telling the story  of the three sisters living at the bottom 
of a treacle-well83, who were learning to draw.
“What did they draw?” said Alice [...].
“Treacle,” said the Dormouse [...].
[---]
Alice did not wish to offend the Dormouse again, so she began very cautiously: 
“But I don’t understand. Where did they draw the treacle from?”
“You can draw water out of a water-well,” said the Hatter; “so I should think 
you could draw treacle out of a treacle-well—eh, stupid?”
“But  they were in the well,” Alice said to the Dormouse, not  choosing to notice 
this last remark.
“Of course they were,” said the Dormouse: “well in.”
This answer so confused poor Alice, that  she let the Dormouse go on for some 
time without interrupting it.
“They were learning to draw,” the Dormouse went on [...]; “and they drew all 
manner of things—everything that begins with an M——” (pp. 59-60)
In this case, ‘draw’ and ‘well’ audibly  and materially refer to several different things. ‘Draw’ is 
alternately  used as the verb that could signify sketching a picture, and draining or extracting. ‘Well’ 
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is used as a noun, signifying a structure used to extract for example ground water. However, the 
Dormouse also uses this as an adverb, as the three sisters were well (thoroughly) in the well. Alice 
cannot sort out this confusion, and the Mad Hatter, the Dormouse and the March Hare seem to 
regard her as stupid: how could she not understand what they mean, when they mean exactly  what 
they say?
The passages discussed above include what can be named involuntary punning, if seen from the 
characters in Wonderland’s point of view. Willful punning is also found in the text, for example in 
the trial of “Who stole the tarts?”. (pp. 86-97) The King attempts to interpret the letter brought into 
evidence by the White Rabbit. He initially claims it is about the Knave, who is accused of stealing 
the tarts, and the Queen.
“‘We know it to be true’—that’s the jury, of course—‘If she should push the 
matter on’—that must be the Queen—‘What would become of you?—What, 
indeed! [---] 
Then again—‘before she had this fit’—you never had fits, my dear, I think?” he 
said to the Queen.
“Never!” said the Queen, furiously, throwing an inkstand at the Lizard as she 
spoke. [---]
“Then the words don’t fit you,” said the King looking round the court  with a 
smile. There was a dead silence.
“It’s a pun!” the King added in an angry tone, and everybody laughed. (pp. 95-96)
Here, pun is intended by the King, who expects his cleverness to be understood by  the attendants of 
the trial. Contrary to involuntary punning, he is offended and angry when no one recognizes this. 
4.2.2 “Off with their heads!”
Apparently, the différance of sense has not taken care of the différance of sounds or signs, as the 
Duchess implies. (p. 71) The linguist  Alan Partington points out, as others have done before him, 
that “[...] there has never been an entirely  satisfactory account of the actual linguistic mechanisms 
wordplay depends upon.”84  Gordon Bearn argues that any attempt to explain the possibilities of 
puns comes very  close to a Derridean understanding, which most philosophers of language would 
like to avoid.85
In “The Possibility Of Puns: A Defense of Derrida” (1995), Bearn writes: “[t]he air of crime 
clings to puns. In some contexts the use of a pun is enough to convict one of the fallacy of 
equivocation, and even where [they are] "simply" fun, we refuse to laugh. By groaning, we punish 
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the punster. Apparently we take puns more seriously than we consistently insist.”86 The seriousness 
of puns, identified by  Bearn, is the destabilizing effect they have on the notion that several of the 
inhabitants of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World hold on to: the conception that when a 
word is used, it  only evokes the intended, particular meaning.87 What a pun effectively makes us 
notice, is the uncontrollable power of words: the speaker can, contrary to intention or context, 
trigger several other possible meanings of a word. The ringing of Derrida’s notion of dissemination 
can be heard with every possibility of punning.
The crime of puns begins to take its form. The lack of control is understandably a frightening 
consequence of dissemination: if there is no one, total meaning in a word, there cannot be one 
meaning to our own intended meaning, no one meaning in what we meant to say, and thereby  no 
one meaning in what we are understood to say.88  Alice’s offense would thus be calling out the 
impossibility  of controlling meaning through intention. Whenever Alice questions the use of a word 
or suggests the possibility of the sign having another meaning, she is angrily and curtly  dismissed. 
The inhabitants of the world Alice is visiting mean what they say, and nothing else. The insult of 
this insinuation is severe, as it  causes the Mouse to refuse to tell the rest of his tale/tail, and the 
Mock Turtle to sulk a little before continuing his story. Contrariwise, whenever an intended pun is 
not recognized, similar reactions are evoked. Seemingly, intention is the key to meaning for the 
characters, and they refuse to accept any other possibility.
As mentioned, context can never be fully secured in Wonderland or the Looking-Glass World. 
Due to what Alice identifies as nonsense and absurdities, anything is possible. One could thus argue 
that the context and premisses presented in the Alice texts are an example of non-ordinary 
circumstances, with non-serious consequences to ordinary  language events. However, this can also 
be understood differently, and as having a greater exposing power. Even though the conceivabilities 
in the realm do not correlate with the possibilities of the ‘real’ world and makes context a non-stable 
factor of meaning insurance, this should perhaps not be regarded as something that is specific or 
special for Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World. Bearn argues that the idea of context being 
able to overshadow other possible meanings of a word, making dissemination irrelevant to ordinary 
communication, relies on the notion that context can be “determined independently of the 
disseminating significances of our words. If they  cannot, if what context I am in is determined by 
what I have said, then the disseminating significances of what I have said, could not [...] be 
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constrained by what context I am in.”89  Therefore, the context where an utterance is made is 
determined by what is uttered, and as dissemination follows every  utterance, no context can be 
determined independently from dissemination. The conceivabilities of context are distorted in 
Wonderland and in the Looking-Glass World, however this is always a possibility through 
dissemination. 
Thus, neither intention nor context can veil dissemination. Intention cannot ensure that the said 
and the meant are unquestionably identical, and context cannot ensure that the recipient of the 
utterance understands the intended meaning: dissemination accompanies every word and has the 
potential of disrupting context.
How does this expose the paradoxical condition of language? Alice works within the necessity of 
assuming some intention and context in order to attribute meaning to what the inhabitants of 
Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World say, but finds her assumptions to be wrong, leaving the 
impossibility  exposed. Context  and intention fail as concealers of other possible meanings. If 
dissemination is a possibility that  accompanies every word, every utterance, every intention, every 
context, then it  is possible that no message has ever been understood completely  by anyone.90 The 
punsters crime is thus the exposing of this rather terrifying condition. But paradoxically, every 
utterance must  engage in this possibility. The characters Alice meets refuse to accept this, claiming 
that they mean only what they say. The consequences of the paradoxical condition of language, 
where the ‘accidental’ effects, the context  and even the presence of our own intended meaning of 
the utterances can never be mastered, are not pleasant to be reminded of. No wonder there are some 
many capital offenses in Wonderland. 
4.3 “I’m sure I didn’t mean——”
Alice’s confusion regarding what the characters in Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World say 
and mean, can also be reversed: Alice is also misunderstood when she uses figures of speech or 
established expressions in conversation. 
4.3.1 “I only meant that I didn’t understand”
The phrase ‘I beg your pardon’ is used by Alice several times in texts, most interestingly  when she 
wishes the person she is conversing with to clarify what they mean. In Through the Looking-Glass, 
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Humpty Dumpty tells Alice that he was given the cravat91 he is wearing as an un-birthday present 
from the White King and Queen. Alice, not knowing what an un-birthday present is, says “‘I beg 
your pardon?’”, and Humpty Dumpty replies “‘I’m not offended.’” Alice then explains “‘I mean, 
what is an un-birthday present?’” (p. 162) Humpty  Dumpty interprets Alice’s words as her wishing 
to be pardoned of some offense she has made. 
Further on, the White King is explaining to Alice why he needs two messengers, “‘[o]ne to 
come, and one to go.’” (p. 171) Again Alice say’s “‘I beg your pardon?’”, and the White King 
answers “‘[i]t  isn’t respectable to beg’ [...]. ‘I only meant that I didn’t understand,’ said Alice. ‘Why 
one to come and one to go?’” (Ibid.) The begging is thus taken at its word by the White King.
After Alice has been made Queen in the chess game, she finds an arched doorway with the words 
“QUEEN ALICE” written on it. (p. 198) She tries to knock and ring the bell in order to get in, when 
an old frog appears:
“What is it, now?” the Frog said in a deep hoarse whisper.
Alice turned round, ready to find fault in anybody. “Where’s the servant  whose 
business it is to answer the door?” she began angrily.
“Which door?” said the Frog.
Alice almost stamped with irritation at  the slow drawl in which he spoke. “This 
door, of course!”
[---]
“To answer the door?” he said. “What’s it  been asking of?” He was so hoarse 
that Alice could scarcely hear him.
“I don’t know what you mean,” she said.
“I speaks English, doesn’t  I?” the Frog went on. “Or are you deaf? What did it 
ask you?”
“Nothing!” Alice said impatiently. “I’ve been knocking at it!” (p. 199)
The expression ‘answer the door’ is thus taken literally, and not as a metonymy referring to opening 
the door for the person who is knocking or ringing the doorbell. The misunderstanding suggests that 
Alice means that the door has been asking something, which seemingly  would be possible in the 
Looking-Glass World.
4.3.2 “Then you should say what you mean”
At the Mad Tea-Party, phrases that  are ingrained in the English language are also taken at  their 
word.
“Why is a raven like a writing-desk?”
“Come, we shall have some fun now!” though Alice. “I’m glad they’ve begun 
asking riddles—I believe I can guess that,” she added aloud.
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“Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?” said the March 
Hare.
“Exactly so,” said Alice.
“Then you should say what you mean,” the March Hare went on.
“I do,” Alice hastily replied; “at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s the 
same thing, you know.”
“Not the same thing a bit!” said the Hatter. “Why, you might just as well say 
that ‘I see what I eat’ is the same thing as ‘I eat what I see’!” (p. 55)
Alice’s meaning is questioned, and Alice states that she means exactly  what the March Hare 
proposes. The March Hare then urges Alice to say what she means, implying that “‘I believe I can 
guess that’” does not mean that she thinks she can find the answer to the riddle. Further on in the 
tea-party, Alice is so offended by a remark made by  the Mad Hatter that she walks off in disgust: 
“‘Really, now you ask me,’ said Alice, very much confused, ‘I don’t  think——’ ‘Then you 
shouldn’t talk,’ said the Hatter.” (p. 60) The words ‘I don’t  think’ are understood literally, as if Alice 
was lacking cognitive abilities.
The phrases Alice uses are not foreign for any  English speaker, and have successfully been given 
an established meaning through previous speech acts. Thus, these discrepancies between the said 
and the meant are not usually something that is noticed in conversation. However, for many  of the 
characters in Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World, literal meaning seems to be the governing 
authority. Alice does not mean exactly what she says, as requested by the March Hare. 
These passages expose that saying what you mean, and meaning what you say are not the same, 
contrary to what Alice proposes. The meaning of these expressions and phrases are sufficiently 
internalized in the English language, and what is literally being said would not be taken as the 
meaning. Their literal meaning seems to have been forgotten. In the paradoxical condition of 
language, discrepancies between what is said and what is meant are not products of special 
circumstances, but are evident in everyday conversational expressions. Alice is clearly irritated 
when she is questioned whether what she says is really what she means, just as the characters of 
Wonderland were offended when she questioned them. However, Alice’s anger is directed at the 
unwillingness of the characters to assume an established meaning to these phrases. And why should 
they  assume a more figurative meaning, as they enter into conversation with the principle that 
everyone should just say what they mean? 
Thus, these passages expose the paradox Derrida outlines: the process of understanding is reliant 
on assumptions of meaning, context and intention, but this does not stand as security for successful 
exchange. If someone refuses to indulge in this condition of language and understanding, then 
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vexingly enough every appeal to an established expression can always be questioned: is what you 
are saying really what you are saying? Is what you are saying really what you mean? 
4.4 ‘When I use a word...”
Theories of language have a vital place in the Alice books. Through different perspectives, the texts 
play with the foundation of meaning: what makes a word mean what it does?  
In Through the Looking-Glass, Humpty  Dumpty presents his view of the matter. When asking 
Alice her name and business, he is displeased and asks what her name means. Doubtfully, Alice 
asks if a name must mean something: “‘[o]f course it must,’ Humpty Dumpty  said with a short 
laugh: ‘my name means the shape I am—and a good handsome shape it is too. With a name like 
yours, you might be any shape, almost.’” (p. 160) This view of names states that there must be a 
connection between the name and the object it names, that ‘Humpty Dumpty’ would refer to his 
egg-round shape. According to Humpty Dumpty, Alice’s name does not signify  some property of 
her exterior or character. The link between name and object could thus be a realistic connection, or 
a demand from Humpty Dumpty that Alice must give a meaning to her name.
Discussing the possibility of getting three hundred and sixty four un-birthday presents, and only 
one birthday  present, Humpty Dumpty exclaims: “‘There’s glory for you!’” (p. 163) Alice’s remark 
that she does not know what he means be glory, brings out a contemptuous smile: “‘[o]f course you 
don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’” (Ibid.) Alice objects 
that this is not what glory means, and the passage where the arbitrary signification of Humpty 
Dumpty’s words are revealed should be quoted in its entirety:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means 
just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master–––that’s all.”
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began 
again. “They’ve a temper, some of them—particularly verbs: they’re the proudest—
adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole 
lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s what I say!”
“Would you tell me, please,” said Alice, “what that means?”
“Now you talk like a reasonable child,” said Humpty Dumpty, looking very 
pleased. “I meant by ‘impenetrability’ that  we’ve had enough of that subject, and it 
would be just as well if you’d mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you 
don’t mean to stop here all the rest of your life.”
“That’s a great deal to make one word mean,” Alice said in a thoughtful tone.
“When I make a word do a lot of work like that,” said Humpty Dumpty, “I pay it 
extra.” (pp. 163-164)
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Seemingly, a choice between two possible interpretations must be made from this passage: is 
Humpty Dumpty  the master of all language, making him the transcendental signified that controls 
the process of all signification, or is he claiming to be the master of what words mean when he uses 
them, naming his intentions as the sole issuer of meaning? As it was necessary for him to ask what 
‘Alice’ means, this would imply that he is only the master of his own intended meaning: Alice must 
give meaning to the words she uses, and Humpty Dumpty to the words he uses. This interpretation 
is strengthened by Humpty Dumpty’s uncertainty with the word ‘mome’ when he explains the poem 
Jabberwocky to Alice: “‘[...] ‘mome’ I’m not certain about. I think it’s short for ‘from home’—
meaning that they’d lost their way, you know.’” (p. 166) Thus, it can be argued that Humpty 
Dumpty claims he is the master of his own words. He manages them, gives them meaning, and pays 
them extra when he makes them mean a lot.
Nevertheless, it  is implied that Humpty Dumpty cannot fully be the master of the words he uses, 
as he calls verbs proud, compared to adjectives. Words apparently  also have a say in the process of 
signification. Some sort of inescapable will seemingly secures that at least  verbs do not wish to 
mean just anything. Simultaneously, Humpty Dumpty outlines a completely arbitrary  language only 
relative to the meaning he wishes to convey, and that he to some extent has a difficult time 
managing words. A pre-existing structure of words seems to be in place, which Humpty Dumpty 
must take into account when he makes the words mean something.
Humpty Dumpty’s use of the word ‘glory’ is what evokes his claim of words meaning what he 
chooses. Alice already has some idea of what the word means, as she opposes the definition 
Humpty Dumpty gives to ‘glory’, exposing a discrepancy between the said and the meant. 
However, here one must  consider the possibility of signs being repeated and altered in language, 
and having the ability to signify beyond their literal meaning. Humpty  Dumpty  and Alice are 
discussing un-birthday presents, and Alice states that she likes birthday presents the best. Humpty 
Dumpty implicitly argues that by shear mathematics he can prove that un-birthday  presents are 
better, as there are more of them. (pp. 162-163) By his understanding, the difference in quantity 
makes it incomprehensible to state that one birthday present is better than three hundred and sixty 
four un-birthday presents. His exclamation “‘There’s glory for you!’” could thus refer to the glory 
and superiority of his argument, or be an ironic statement that discards Alice’s preference as lowly 
and absurd. When Alice objects to Humpty Dumpty’s definition of ‘glory’ as a ‘nice knock-down 
argument’, the problem of established and literal meaning, a fixed context and understanding comes 
into focus. Humpty  Dumpty takes use of the paradoxical condition of language, where the 
established meaning of a word can be altered and exceed its ‘proper’ context. The same goes for the 
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possibility of ‘impenetrability’ meaning “‘[...] we’ve had enough of that subject, and it would be 
just as well if you’d mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don’t mean to stop here 
all the rest of your life.’” (p. 164) The management of language is perhaps impenetrable, and 
Humpty Dumpty  is warning Alice that he sees no use in a prolonged discussion of the subject. Thus, 
this understanding of words and meaning somewhat exceeds the governing authority of literal 
meaning previously discussed, as Humpty Dumpty  claims that the meaning of his words relies 
purely on his intentions.
This passage exposes that a word can be distorted from its dictionary definition and be repeated 
and altered in a context that gives it a different meaning. For Derrida, this is a demand that the sign 
must fulfill in order to be a sign.92 Further, this exposes that  discrepancies between the said and the 
meant do not necessarily  leave what is said meaningless or nonsensical. Humpty  Dumpty thus 
proposes that meaning is not stable, still he is always sure of what his words mean: his intentions 
are the stable factor in the equation. However, Humpty  Dumpty’s confidence in himself as the 
master of the words he uses and his idea of a totalized arbitrary system made up  of pure play, where 
meaning is only relative to his intentions, poses a problem.
The understanding of intention as the authority  insist  on presence as necessary  for an utterance to 
have meaning. When claiming that Alice cannot know what he means by ‘glory’ before he tells her, 
Humpty Dumpty evokes the notion that nothing can ever by  understood if the speaker is not present 
to explain themselves. Also, this evokes the idea that an utterance must always be supplemented in 
order for the receiver of the message to know what is meant, as meaning lies purely in the speakers 
intention. This implies that nothing could ever have meaning outside the context of a spoken 
conversation. Would the meaning of ‘glory’ that Humpty Dumpty proposes be lost if he was absent? 
Taking Derrida’s understanding of language into account, the answer to this would be no: despite 
intentions, ‘glory’ must have the potential of exceeding its established meaning, and its ‘proper’ 
context. Thus, the words Humpty Dumpty uses can mean many different things, but this possibility 
cannot be a product of his mastery: it is a product and property of the condition of language. 
Further, Humpty  Dumpty implies that his mastery makes words mean neither more nor less than 
what he intends, staying true to the mantra of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World. He 
scornfully  discards Alice’s objection that ‘glory’ has another meaning. Regardless of whether 
Alice’s definition of ‘glory’ correlates with the meaning he wishes to convey, Humpty Dumpty does 
not have the power to exclude all other possible meanings. Even Humpty  Dumpty’s own definition 
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92 Derrida, Politics of Friendship, op.cit, p. 216
of ‘[t]here’s glory for you’ has more than one possible meaning: is he referring to his argument? Is 
he being ironic?
This passage works within and exposes a complex paradox without outlining a clear and reliable 
pathway towards a stable foundation. Humpty Dumpty proposes several factors that play  a part in 
the process of signification: a realistic connection, an arbitrary connection, the intention and 
presence of the speaker, and the will of verbs. He dismisses all meanings that  may accompany his 
words as meaning, if they are not a part of his intentions. The relationship between the said and the 
meant is simultaneously  destabilized in terms of established meaning, while the presence and 
intentions of the speaker is named the central, stabilizing factor. However, he cannot be the master 
of the words he uses, as Alice suggests that they  have other meanings. His intentions may correlate 
to some extent with a possible meaning of ‘glory’, but this cannot solely be due to his mastery. An 
utterance has always the possibility of meaning something more, even if Humpty Dumpty fell down 
from the narrow wall he is sitting on, and “[a]ll the Kings horses and all the King’s men / Couldn’t 
put Humpty Dumpty in his place again”. (p. 159)
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has studied how the relationship between the said and the meant in Wonderland and the 
Looking-Glass World exposes the paradoxical condition of language. In the theoretical framework 
it was concluded that it is the condition of language that  makes discrepancies between the said and 
meant possible. The paradox language must work within was outlined in three points:
(1) A lawful, pre-existing structure of language, and a proper meaning of the sign must be 
assumed in order for an utterance to mean something.93
(2) A lawful, totalized structure of language can never be achieved and is strictly  impossible.94 
Proper meaning is necessarily absent and deferred.95
(3) All utterances potentially mean something other than what is said, and meaning cannot be 
firmly governed.
I have argued that puns destabilize the notion between the said and the meant, as puns fiercely 
demonstrate how dissemination accompanies every sign. Meaning is fertilely  dispersed by every 
word, and with the ‘accidental’ identical or similar audible or written sign, puns reveal the 
unpleasantness of this notion. Alice’s questioning and suggestions concerning a possible other 
meaning, angers and offends the inhabitants of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass World, as this 
exposes that they cannot control the meaning of their words through intention or context. I thus 
conclude that the wish to maintain one intentional meaning to what is said as the authority, is 
destabilized. I have further argued that the established expressions Alice’s uses turn the focus 
towards literal meaning. The characters Alice meets refuse to assume a more figurative meaning to 
phrases, and I thereby conclude that  this exposes how vital assumptions of meaning and context are 
in conversation. Finally, I have argued that Humpty Dumpty’s understanding of his mastery evokes 
the paradox of language. Naming himself the master of language, he has the power to make words 
mean whatever he wishes. He claims that his intention, presence and supplementary explanation is 
necessary  for Alice to know what his words mean. However, Humpty Dumpty’s mastery cannot 
exclude other possible meanings, as Alice implicitly reminds him. 
Based on the presented material, this study concludes that the paradoxical condition of language 
is exposed through Alice’s need to assume meaning and context of the words and utterances of the 
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characters she meets. This evokes point (1) in the paradoxical condition of language. However, she 
finds that this can never be stable and ensured. All the confusions that occur are not merely the 
product of the inconceivable context of the texts, but are made possible by the impossibility  of a 
totalization of meaning, structure and context in all lingual circumstances, thus illustrating point (2). 
Further, the characters refuse to accept this condition. Continuously stating that  they mean exactly 
what they say, they subsequently exclude the possibility of their words having other meanings. 
Literal meaning, or one meaning bound to the intention and presences of the speaker is in their view 
what governs understanding. No assumptions are necessary, as everyone should say  what they 
mean, and mean what they say. With this idea of meaning, the characters of Wonderland and the 
Looking-Glass World refuse point (2) and (3). Still, their unwillingness does not make their 
intentions the master, which is exposed by Alice’s simultaneously  naïve, questioning and displeased 
attitude towards all the confusions of meaning she experiences. 
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